Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13MaRDI QIDQ2937754zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Dütting, Martin Starnberger, Monika R. Henzinger

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.3153

zbMATH Keywords

VCG mechanismcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that the welfare loss increases in expressiveness. All our bounds apply to equilibrium concepts that can be computed in polynomial time as well as to learning outcomes.

Recommendations

• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966910 (Why is no real title available?)
• Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• Algorithms as mechanisms: the price of anarchy of relax and round
• Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
• The combinatorial world (of auctions) according to GARP

This page was built for publication: Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2937754)