Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions

DOI10.1287/moor.2017.0920zbMath1443.91165arXiv1307.5216OpenAlexW2892352615WikidataQ129253225 ScholiaQ129253225MaRDI QIDQ5219714

Felix Fischer, Paul Dütting, David C. Parkes

Publication date: 12 March 2020

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.5216

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designgeneralized first-price auctionprofit target strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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