The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
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Publication:3601192
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(41)- Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
- Synchronized matching with incomplete information
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Signaling and optimal sorting
- Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility
- All-pay matching contests
- Pre-match investment with frictions
- The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
- Informational hold up and intermediaries
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Status, affluence, and inequality: rank-based comparisons in games of status
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Pricing group membership
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
- Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
- Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
- Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets
- Pre-matching gambles
- Sorting expertise
- The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews
- Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values
- Dress to impress: brands as status symbols
- The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Coarse matching with incomplete information
- Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
- Assortative matching by lottery contests
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Varying the number of signals in matching markets
- Matching through position auctions
- Harmful signaling in matching markets
- Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers
- Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
- THE SHAPING OF A GENDER NORM: MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND FOOT‐BINDING IN HISTORICAL CHINA
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