The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2008.00517.XzbMATH Open1153.91690OpenAlexW2114537400MaRDI QIDQ3601192FDOQ3601192

Authors: Heidrun C. Hoppe, Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela 

Publication date: 10 February 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (41)

• Synchronized matching with incomplete information
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility
• All-pay matching contests
• Pre-match investment with frictions
• Informational hold up and intermediaries
• The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Pricing group membership
• Status, affluence, and inequality: rank-based comparisons in games of status
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
• Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
• Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets
• Pre-matching gambles
• Sorting expertise
• The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews
• Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market
• Dress to impress: brands as status symbols
• The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments
• Group stability in matching with interdependent values
• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• Assortative matching by lottery contests
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Varying the number of signals in matching markets
• Matching through position auctions
• Harmful signaling in matching markets
• Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers
• Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
• THE SHAPING OF A GENDER NORM: MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND FOOT‐BINDING IN HISTORICAL CHINA
• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers

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