The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
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Publication:3601192
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00517.xzbMath1153.91690MaRDI QIDQ3601192
Heidrun C. Hoppe, Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela
Publication date: 10 February 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
91B68: Matching models
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