Dress to impress: brands as status symbols

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.009MaRDI QIDQ2437809zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rogério Mazali, José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp567.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcompetitionsignalingwelfaremonopolytaxstatusfree entrybrand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

• Monopolistic signal provision
• Dynamic pricing of a status symbol
• Status and welfare under monopolistic competition
• Conspicuous consumption, economic growth, and taxation
• A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3051436 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coarse Matching
• Marriage and Class
• Monopolistic signal provision
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Social norms and random matching games
• Status, affluence, and inequality: rank-based comparisons in games of status
• Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(2)

• Fashion and wealth accumulation
• A theory of esteem based peer pressure

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