Dress to impress: brands as status symbols

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.009zbMATH Open1282.91070OpenAlexW2014102950MaRDI QIDQ2437809FDOQ2437809

Rogério Mazali, José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp567.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcompetitionsignalingwelfaremonopolytaxstatusfree entrybrand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Status, affluence, and inequality: rank-based comparisons in games of status
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Marriage and Class
• Social norms and random matching games
• Coarse Matching
• Monopolistic signal provision
• Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk

Cited In (2)

• Fashion and wealth accumulation
• A theory of esteem based peer pressure

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