Assortative Matching and Search

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4530967

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00112zbMath1020.91045OpenAlexW2155424087MaRDI QIDQ4530967

Lones Smith, Robert Shimer

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63295



Related Items

Matching in closed-form: equilibrium, identification, and comparative statics, Pre-match investment with frictions, Managing parallel inquiries in agents' two-sided search, Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals, DIVERSE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COMPETITION FOR TALENT, Assortative matching with network spillovers, Inefficient sorting under output sharing, Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality, Separation cycles, A result on equilibrium matching with search frictions, Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity, Electronic service matching: failure of incentive compatibility in vickrey auctions, Assortative Outsourcing with Exit, Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform, INFERENCE ON TWO-COMPONENT MIXTURES UNDER TAIL RESTRICTIONS, The even split rule in positive assortative matching, Stable marriages and search frictions, Dynamically stable matching, Sorting in iterated incumbency contests, Sufficient statistics for frictional wage dispersion and growth, Bargaining in small dynamic markets, Strategic mating with common preferences, A Model of Partnership Formation with Friction and Multiple Criteria, Partnership formation based on multiple traits, Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets, Workplace heterogeneity and the returns to versatility, Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions, Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game, A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility., Incentives and the structure of teams, A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time, Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players, The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game, Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity, Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines, Identification of mixture models using support variations, Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships, Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions, Steady states in matching and bargaining, Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality, A college admissions clearinghouse, Exploration costs as a means for improving performance in multiagent systems, Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents, Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution, Bargaining in dynamic markets, Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency, Introduction to search theory and applications, Sorting by search intensity, Matching with noise and the acceptance curse, Targeted search in matching markets, MARRIAGE, MARKETS, AND MONEY: A COASIAN THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION, Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents, On the empirical content of the Beckerian marriage model, The effect of meeting rates on matching outcomes, Synchronized matching with incomplete information, Verifiability and group formation in markets, Monotonic matching in search equilibrium, Index-wise comparative statics, As Good as Married? A Model of Premarital Cohabitation and Learning, Determination of different types of fixed effects in three-dimensional panels*, The bargaining trap