Matching in closed-form: equilibrium, identification, and comparative statics
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Publication:272284
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0961-8zbMath1367.91143arXiv2102.04295MaRDI QIDQ272284
Alfred Galichon, Raicho Bojilov
Publication date: 20 April 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04295
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