Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
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Publication:3401205
DOI10.1162/QJEC.2008.123.1.49zbMATH Open1179.91192OpenAlexW2154288561MaRDI QIDQ3401205FDOQ3401205
Authors: Augustin Landier, Xavier Gabaix 
Publication date: 29 January 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w12365.pdf
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- Extreme Value Estimation for Heterogeneous Data
- The impact of competition on prices with numerous firms
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- A review of more than one hundred Pareto-tail index estimators
- Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
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- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- Promotion, turnover, and compensation in the executive labor market
- Inefficient sorting under output sharing
- ``Since you're so rich, you must be really smart: talent, rent sharing, and the finance wage premium
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
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- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
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- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
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- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM PROFESSIONAL CYCLING
- Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- Academic wages and pyramid schemes: a mathematical model
- A simple theory of Pareto-distributed earnings
- Neoclassical production, scarcity of skills and Pareto distributions
- Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
- Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
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