Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks

DOI10.1007/S00712-016-0472-XMaRDI QIDQ1654094zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michela Cella, Federico Etro

Publication date 7 August 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper328.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesinvestmentsoligopolyscreeningtwo way distortion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• Common Agency
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*

Cited in

(8)

• When vagueness induces indirect competition: Strategic incompleteness of contracts
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
• Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
• Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
• Correlated Contracts in Oligopoly
• Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition
• Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
• Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

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