Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities

DOI10.1007/S00291-008-0132-9MaRDI QIDQ2267373zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Holger Asseburg, Christian Hofmann

Publication date 1 March 2010

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-008-0132-9

zbMATH Keywords

managerial incentivesrelative performance evaluationproduct market competitioncontract externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Commitment and observability in games
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result

Cited in

(16)

• Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
• Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
• Stochastic Dominance of Pension Plans
• Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm
• Contractual externalities and systemic risk
• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
• On the value of relative comparisons in firms
• Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market
• Profitable environmental corporate social responsibility under managers' relative profit performance competition
• Competition and relational contracts in the Rwanda coffee chain
• Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
• Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns

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