Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns

DOI10.1007/s11579-010-0035-9zbMath1255.91205MaRDI QIDQ1932540

Xuhu Wan, Levon Goukasian

Publication date: 20 January 2013

Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-010-0035-9

zbMATH Keywords

envy; hidden action; behavioral contract theory; jealousy; multi-agent problems; optimal effort; pay-for-performance sensitivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

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