Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns

DOI10.1007/S11579-010-0035-9zbMath1255.91205OpenAlexW2097307635MaRDI QIDQ1932540

Xuhu Wan, Levon Goukasian

Publication date: 20 January 2013

Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-010-0035-9

zbMATH Keywords

envyhidden actionbehavioral contract theoryjealousymulti-agent problemsoptimal effortpay-for-performance sensitivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Time-consistent investment and reinsurance under relative performance concerns ⋮ Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Optimal R\&D investment strategy of pollution abatement and incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion ⋮ LINKED RECURSIVE PREFERENCES AND OPTIMALITY ⋮ Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection

Cites Work

• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• BSDE with quadratic growth and unbounded terminal value
• OPTIMAL MULTI-AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Theories of Pay and Unemployment: Survey Evidence from Swedish Manufacturing Firms
• Corporate Governance

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