Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection

DOI10.1155/2020/9317019zbMath1444.91122OpenAlexW3000273033WikidataQ126397130 ScholiaQ126397130MaRDI QIDQ779104

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 21 July 2020

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/9317019

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modeladverse selectionoptimal contractsseparating equilibrium contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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