An Adverse Selection Approach to Power Pricing
DOI10.1137/19M1260578zbMath1443.91193arXiv1706.01934OpenAlexW3125248342MaRDI QIDQ5220189
Dylan Possamaï, Clémence Alasseur, Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez, Ivar Ekeland, Romuald Elie
Publication date: 11 March 2020
Published in: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.01934
calculus of variationscontract theorypower managementadverse selectionelectricity pricing\(u\)-convexity
Utility theory (91B16) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Related Items (5)
Cites Work
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