Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives

DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1201zbMath1498.91235arXiv1810.09063OpenAlexW2896084166MaRDI QIDQ5868950

Nizar Touzi, Dylan Possamaï, René Aïd

Publication date: 26 September 2022

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09063

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddemand responseretail electricity markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (6)

Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network ⋮ Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management ⋮ Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems ⋮ Principal-agent problem with multiple principals ⋮ Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies ⋮ An exit contract optimization problem

Cites Work

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• Pricing of fluctuations in electricity markets
• Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
• Interruptible electric power service contracts
• Interruptible Electricity Contracts from an Electricity Retailer's Point of View: Valuation and Optimal Interruption
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Exotic Options for Interruptible Electricity Supply Contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Dynamic Electricity Pricing to Smart Homes
• An Adverse Selection Approach to Power Pricing

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