Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network
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Publication:6042791
DOI10.1137/21m1464026zbMath1514.91101arXiv2111.13505OpenAlexW3215205652MaRDI QIDQ6042791
Alejandro Jofre, Dylan Possamaï, Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez
Publication date: 4 May 2023
Published in: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.13505
Dynamic programming in optimal control and differential games (49L20) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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