Economics of collective monitoring: a study of environmentally constrained electricity generators

DOI10.1007/S10287-015-0247-9MaRDI QIDQ1789575zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 10 October 2018

Published in Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-015-0247-9

zbMATH Keywords

policy analysisgeneralised Nash equilibriumcoupled-constraints gamesderegulated electric industrypollution constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
• Economic problems with constraints: how efficiency relates to equilibrium
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• Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system

Cites work

• An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems and Newton methods
• Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities
• Nonpoint pollution control: inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats
• Numerical solutions to coupled-constraint (or generalised Nash) equilibrium problems
• On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities
• Optimization reformulations of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem using Nikaido-Isoda-type functions
• Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games
• Restricted generalized Nash equilibria and controlled penalty algorithm
• Towards an understanding of tradeoffs between regional wealth, tightness of a common environmental constraint and the sharing rules

Cited in

(2)

• Existence of projected solutions for generalized Nash equilibrium problems
• Economic problems with constraints: how efficiency relates to equilibrium

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• NIRA-GUI
• NIRA-3

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