Governmental incentives for Green bonds investment

DOI10.1007/s11579-022-00320-wzbMath1497.91270arXiv2101.00648OpenAlexW3198830660MaRDI QIDQ2155563

Dylan Possamaï, Bastien Baldacci

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.00648

zbMATH Keywords

regulationmoral hazardincentivesGreen bonds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Portfolio theory (91G10) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (2)

Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network ⋮ Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies

Cites Work

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• Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management

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