Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly
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Publication:322585
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.10.024zbMATH Open1346.91130OpenAlexW2195725622MaRDI QIDQ322585FDOQ322585
Authors: Weixiang Huang, Wenhui Zhou 
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024
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Cites Work
- The carbon-constrained EOQ
- Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products
- Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains
- Design for the environment: impact of regulatory policies on product development
- Pricing, market coverage and capacity: can green and brown products co-exist?
Cited In (8)
- Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty
- Working along both lines? The relationship between government green publicity and emissions tax
- How much is enough? Government subsidies in supporting green product development
- Strategy analysis of governments and new energy product manufacturers and consumers based on evolutionary game model
- Assessing subsidy policies for green products: operational and environmental perspectives
- Information investment and sharing in a two-echelon supply chain under government subsidy and consumer preference for energy-saving products
- How different government subsidy objects impact on green supply chain decision considering consumer group complexity
- Competitive advantage of qualified WEEE recyclers through EPR legislation
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