Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.10.024MaRDI QIDQ322585zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Weixiang Huang, Wenhui Zhou

Publication date 7 October 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024

zbMATH Keywords

subsidycontract designsenvironmental performanceproduct design and pricingsustainable operations management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers
• An adverse selection approach to power pricing
• Shared-savings contracts for indirect materials in supply chains: channel profits and environmental impacts
• Separating and pooling incentive mechanisms of ecological regulation: the~cases of developed and developing countries
• Incentive contract design for supply chain enterprise's pollution abatement with carbon tax

Cites work

• Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products
• Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains
• Design for the environment: impact of regulatory policies on product development
• Pricing, market coverage and capacity: can green and brown products co-exist?
• The carbon-constrained EOQ

Cited in

(8)

• Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty
• Working along both lines? The relationship between government green publicity and emissions tax
• How much is enough? Government subsidies in supporting green product development
• Strategy analysis of governments and new energy product manufacturers and consumers based on evolutionary game model
• Assessing subsidy policies for green products: operational and environmental perspectives
• Information investment and sharing in a two-echelon supply chain under government subsidy and consumer preference for energy-saving products
• How different government subsidy objects impact on green supply chain decision considering consumer group complexity
• Competitive advantage of qualified WEEE recyclers through EPR legislation

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