Incentive contract design for supply chain enterprise's pollution abatement with carbon tax
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Publication:6484339
DOI10.1155/2021/5556796zbMATH Open1512.9005MaRDI QIDQ6484339FDOQ6484339
Authors: Jing Yu, Chi Zhou, Yixin Wang, Zhibing Liu
Publication date: 24 January 2022
Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)
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- The abatement contract for low-carbon demand in supply chain with single and multiple abatement mechanism under asymmetric information
- Learning of supply chain cost-revenue sharing contract in the form of trade-off mechanism in pollution control problem
- Incentive contract design considering fairness preferences and carbon emission reduction multiobjective tasks
- Pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain
- Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly
- Design of an environmental contract under trade credits and carbon emission reduction
- A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
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