Incentive contract design for supply chain enterprise's pollution abatement with carbon tax

DOI10.1155/2021/5556796MaRDI QIDQ6484339zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jing Yu, Chi Zhou, Yixin Wang, Zhibing Liu

Publication date 24 January 2022

Published in Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

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(7)

• The abatement contract for low-carbon demand in supply chain with single and multiple abatement mechanism under asymmetric information
• Learning of supply chain cost-revenue sharing contract in the form of trade-off mechanism in pollution control problem
• Incentive contract design considering fairness preferences and carbon emission reduction multiobjective tasks
• Pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain
• Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly
• Design of an environmental contract under trade credits and carbon emission reduction
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system

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