The abatement contract for low-carbon demand in supply chain with single and multiple abatement mechanism under asymmetric information
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Cites work
- A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
- Allocation policy considering firm's time-varying emission reduction in a cap-and-trade system
- Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach
- Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains
- Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer
- Effect of equity holding on a supply chain's pricing and emission reduction decisions considering information sharing
- Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers
- The carbon-constrained EOQ
Cited in
(7)- Outsourcing contract design for the green transformation of manufacturing systems under asymmetric information
- Operational strategy for low-carbon supply chain under asymmetric information of fairness concerns
- Pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain
- Contracting Emissions Reduction Supply Chain Based on Market Low-Carbon Preference and Carbon Intensity Constraint
- Incentive contract design for supply chain enterprise's pollution abatement with carbon tax
- Blockchain adoption and application in closed-loop production under information asymmetry
- Inventory optimisation in a two-echelon cold chain: sustainable lot-sizing and shipment decisions under carbon cap emissions regulations
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