Allocation policy considering firm's time-varying emission reduction in a cap-and-trade system
DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2606-0zbMATH Open1447.91108OpenAlexW2745375860MaRDI QIDQ2196010FDOQ2196010
Authors: Shaofu Du, Yujiao Zhu, Yangguang Zhu, Wenzhi Tang 
Publication date: 28 August 2020
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2606-0
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
Cites Work
- Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons
- The carbon-constrained EOQ
- Lot sizing with carbon emission constraints
- Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system
- Low-carbon supply policies and supply chain performance with carbon concerned demand
- Formulating and solving sustainable stochastic dynamic facility layout problem: a key to sustainable operations
- International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
- Cournot-Stackelberg games in competitive delocation
- Green, greener or brown: choosing the right color of the product
Cited In (19)
- Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework
- Differential game analysis of carbon emissions reduction and promotion in a sustainable supply chain considering social preferences
- The abatement contract for low-carbon demand in supply chain with single and multiple abatement mechanism under asymmetric information
- Emission allowance allocation mechanism design: a low-carbon operations perspective
- Business models for public emission reduction projects
- Designing and forecasting the differentiated carbon tax scheme based on the principle of ability to pay
- A sustainable economic production model: effects of quality and emissions tax from transportation
- Taxing strategies for carbon emissions based on Stackelberg game
- Cap allocation rules for an online platform supply chain under cap‐and‐trade regulation
- Multistage investment actions with the emission cap
- Optimal mix of emissions taxes and cap-and-trade
- Firm's product carbon reduction decisions in a multi-period cap-and-trade scheme
- Dynamic Competition under Cap and Trade Programs
- Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs
- To pool or not to pool in carbon quotas: analyses of emission regulation and operations in supply chain supernetwork under cap-and-trade policy
- A perspective of evolution for carbon emissions trading market: the dilemma between market scale and government regulation
- Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility
- Manufacturer's R\&D cooperation contract: linear fee or revenue-sharing payment in a low-carbon supply chain
- Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
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