Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_12zbMath1454.91143OpenAlexW2968760345MaRDI QIDQ5140363

Francisco J. André, Luis Miguel de Castro

Publication date: 15 December 2020

Published in: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_12

zbMATH Keywords

oligopolyCournot modelemissions tradingStackelberg modelmarket interaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Market power in output and emissions trading

Cites Work

• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
• Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
• On the Effects of Entry

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