Market power in output and emissions trading

DOI10.3390/G11040043zbMath1457.91281OpenAlexW3092013792MaRDI QIDQ2223644

Francisco J. André, Luis Miguel de Castro

Publication date: 1 February 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040043

zbMATH Keywords

market powerduopolyCournot modelemissions tradingStackelberg model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
• Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework

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