Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1zbMath1422.91286OpenAlexW2516882142MaRDI QIDQ2323587

Francisco J. André, Cristina Mazón, Francisco Alvarez

Publication date: 3 September 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72827/1/MPRA_paper_72827.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyemission permitsincomplete information simultaneous gamesuniform auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Market power in output and emissions trading ⋮ Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework ⋮ Consignment auctions revisited

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions
• Auctioning divisible goods
• A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions
• Can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?
• Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility
• Auctions of Shares
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

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