Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1089-1MaRDI QIDQ2323587zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francisco Alvarez, Cristina Mazón, Francisco J. André

Publication date 3 September 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72827/1/MPRA_paper_72827.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyemission permitsincomplete information simultaneous gamesuniform auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions
• Auctioning divisible goods
• Auctions of Shares
• Can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?
• Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility
• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions
• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections

Cited in

(9)

• Equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits
• Are emissions permits regressive?
• On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits
• A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions
• Consignment auctions revisited
• Market power in output and emissions trading
• Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework
• An auction-bargaining model for initial emission permits
• Effects of competition in first-price auctions

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