Effects of competition in first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8zbMath1480.91112OpenAlexW3127435671MaRDI QIDQ825190

Gino Loyola

Publication date: 17 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8

zbMATH Keywords

competitionfirst-price auctionsaffiliated common valuesaffiliation effectbidding marketsconditionally independent affiliated private information model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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