Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4419348
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00229zbMATH Open1047.91021OpenAlexW2033854831MaRDI QIDQ4419348FDOQ4419348
Authors: Han Hong, Matthew Shum 
Publication date: 13 August 2003
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00229
Recommendations
- Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
- Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
- Compensating for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence
- Winning by default: why is there so little competition in government procurement?
- Winner's curse in toll road concessions
Cited In (21)
- Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
- Effects of competition in first-price auctions
- The value of entrant manufacturers: a study of competition and risk for donor-funded procurement of essential medicines
- Winning by default: why is there so little competition in government procurement?
- The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
- Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
- Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
- Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
- Winner's curse in toll road concessions
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- An Empirical Model of R&D Procurement Contests: An Analysis of the DOD SBIR Program
- Competition for Procurement Contracts and Underinvestment
- Compensating for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence
- Sharp test for equilibrium uniqueness in discrete games with private information and common knowledge unobserved heterogeneity
- Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
This page was built for publication: Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4419348)
