Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
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Publication:2451773
DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2014.02.010zbMath1293.91080OpenAlexW3124529270MaRDI QIDQ2451773
Publication date: 4 June 2014
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2014.02.010
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Nonparametric hypothesis testing (62G10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance ⋮ Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth ⋮ Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator
Cites Work
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- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
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- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Handbook of econometrics. Vol. 5
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