Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
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Publication:2451773
Recommendations
- First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
- Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse
- Auctions with endogenous entry
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
Cites work
- A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
- Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
- Handbook of econometrics. Vol. 5
- Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values
- Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions
- Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Weak convergence and empirical processes. With applications to statistics
- What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
Cited in
(7)- Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
- Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
- Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
- Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
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