Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.07.003zbMATH Open1347.91155OpenAlexW1014540180MaRDI QIDQ894631FDOQ894631

Authors: Matthew Gentry, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu 

Publication date: 2 December 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66100/

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zbMATH Keywords

first price auctioninitial wealthmonotone equilibriumconstant absolute risk aversion (CARA)constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes

Cited In (7)

• Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
• Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?

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