Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.07.003MaRDI QIDQ894631zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew Gentry, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu

Publication date 2 December 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66100/

zbMATH Keywords

first price auctioninitial wealthmonotone equilibriumconstant absolute risk aversion (CARA)constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
• Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
• Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
• Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?

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