Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders
DOI10.1093/restud/rdq001zbMath1215.91028OpenAlexW2152193280MaRDI QIDQ3012092
Sandra Campo, Quang H. Vuong, Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne
Publication date: 30 June 2011
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2003-09.pdf
semiparametric estimationrisk aversionsemiparametric identificationoptimal rateprivate valuetimber auctions
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)
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