A shape constrained estimator of bidding function of first-price sealed-bid auctions
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Publication:1672755
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.001zbMath1396.91287OpenAlexW2553579104MaRDI QIDQ1672755
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.001
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Cites Work
- Nonparametric estimation of utility function in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Empirical implementation of nonparametric first-price auction models
- Quantile-based nonparametric inference for first-price auctions
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders
- Estimating Smooth Monotone Functions
- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions
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