Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
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Publication:5868920
DOI10.1287/deca.2021.0425OpenAlexW3186936744MaRDI QIDQ5868920
Stephen Joe, Muhammad Ejaz, Chaitanya K. Joshi
Publication date: 26 September 2022
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2021.0425
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