Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.010zbMath1274.91223OpenAlexW2051151477MaRDI QIDQ645655

Nir Gavish, Gadi Fibich

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitysimulationsasymmetric auctionsboundary value methodlarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)

Related Items (11)

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers ⋮ Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games ⋮ Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion ⋮ Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations ⋮ Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

Cites Work

• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Dynamical-Systems Approach
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

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