Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
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Publication:6096591
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.12.022OpenAlexW4320056189MaRDI QIDQ6096591
Martin Bichler, Fabian R. Pieroth, Nils Kohring, Matthias Oberlechner
Publication date: 15 September 2023
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.12.022
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