Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2022.12.022OpenAlexW4320056189MaRDI QIDQ6096591FDOQ6096591

Authors: Martin Bichler, Nils Kohring, Matthias Oberlechner, Fabian R. Pieroth 

Publication date: 15 September 2023

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.12.022

zbMATH Keywords

machine learninggame theoryauctions bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (2)

• Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning
• Reinforcement-based adaptive learning in asymmetric two-person bargaining with incomplete information

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