Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6096591
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7064064 (Why is no real title available?)
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- A dominant strategy double auction
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
- Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
- Existence and solution methods for equilibria
- Geometric measure theory.
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Learning in games with continuous action sets and unknown payoff functions
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate
- Nash equilibria, variational inequalities, and dynamical systems
- Numerical Methods for Ordinary Differential Equations
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
- On the Characterization of Local Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games
- Price discovery using a double auction
- Primal-dual subgradient methods for convex problems
- Robust trading mechanisms
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
- The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Variational Inequalities and Economic Equilibrium
Cited in
(2)
This page was built for publication: Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6096591)