Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
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Publication:4316533
DOI10.2307/2951506zbMath0820.90031OpenAlexW1973591521WikidataQ56803972 ScholiaQ56803972MaRDI QIDQ4316533
Steven R. Williams, Aldo Rustichini, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 14 September 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951506
asymmetric informationdouble auctionbargainingmarket microstructureinefficiencyBayesian Nash equilibrium
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