Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
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Publication:1867764
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00069-1zbMath1035.91025OpenAlexW2570593756MaRDI QIDQ1867764
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00069-1
Related Items (10)
Switching from complete to incomplete information ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate ⋮ Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines ⋮ The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms ⋮ Bargaining in dynamic markets ⋮ Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium
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