An optimistic search equilibrium
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Publication:726617
DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0182-9zbMath1349.91122OpenAlexW1897219082MaRDI QIDQ726617
Dipjyoti Majumdar, Huan Xie, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 12 July 2016
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0182-9
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)
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