Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
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Publication:2212748
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.006zbMath1452.91226OpenAlexW3033851773MaRDI QIDQ2212748
Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 24 November 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.006
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Cites Work
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- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market
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