The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016zbMath1217.91081OpenAlexW1966169171MaRDI QIDQ553895

Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov

Publication date: 28 July 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4491

zbMATH Keywords

markets with search frictionsmatching and bargainingtwo-sided incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (4)

Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium ⋮ Entry-deterring agency

Cites Work

• Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
• Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
• The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization

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