The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
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Recommendations
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
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- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
Cites work
- A decentralized market with common values uncertainty: Non-steady states
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and efficiency in networks
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
- Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Cited in
(11)- Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
- Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- For-profit search platforms
- Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
- Convergence speed and preference externalities in a one-sector model with elastic labor supply
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
- An optimistic search equilibrium
- A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model
- Seller competition by mechanism design
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