The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
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Publication:972878
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.009zbMATH Open1245.91041OpenAlexW1965497940MaRDI QIDQ972878FDOQ972878
Authors: Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom Shneyerov 
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1467.pdf
Recommendations
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Sequential bargaining and competition
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
Cites Work
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and efficiency in networks
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- A decentralized market with common values uncertainty: Non-steady states
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
Cited In (11)
- Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
- An optimistic search equilibrium
- Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model
- Convergence speed and preference externalities in a one-sector model with elastic labor supply
- Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
- For-profit search platforms
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