Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding

DOI10.2307/2297530zbMath0636.90007OpenAlexW2002109865MaRDI QIDQ3777758

Asher Wolinsky

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297530

zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctionsdynamic market in steady stateinstantaneous bidding competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (15)

Contractual distortions in a market with frictions ⋮ FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS ⋮ Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices ⋮ A theory of production, matching, and distribution ⋮ Scale returns of a random matching model ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Networks, frictions, and price dispersion ⋮ Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate ⋮ A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms ⋮ Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information ⋮ Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets

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