An ascending double auction
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Publication:946361
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0297-5zbMath1144.91013OpenAlexW1963984539MaRDI QIDQ946361
Michael Peters, Sergei Severinov
Publication date: 23 September 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0297-5
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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