Asymmetric English auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00074-7zbMath1085.91023OpenAlexW3122106534MaRDI QIDQ1414615

Vijay Krishna

Publication date: 4 December 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00074-7

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (21)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations ⋮ Optimal combinatorial mechanism design ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ On the efficiency of the first price auction ⋮ Bidding in a possibly common-value auction ⋮ Efficient assignment with interdependent values ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ On efficiency of the English auction ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders ⋮ Second best efficiency and the English auction ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders ⋮ An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Merger negotiations and ex-post regret ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids

Cites Work

• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• An Efficient Auction
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction

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