English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
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Publication:1007332
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.07.001zbMATH Open1159.91375OpenAlexW3121366827MaRDI QIDQ1007332FDOQ1007332
Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. Manelli, Juan Dubra
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001
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Cites Work
Cited In (10)
- English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
- Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
- Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices
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