Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices

DOI10.3390/G13040050MaRDI QIDQ2091706zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fabio Michelucci

Publication date 2 November 2022

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g13040050

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsEnglish auctionentryreserve prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
• On the efficiency of price competition
• Price competition, free entry, and welfare in congested markets
• Price caps, oligopoly, and entry
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• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
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• Entry deterrence and limit pricing under asymmetric information about common costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2067983

Cites work

• A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
• Auctions with entry
• English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
• Inefficient rushes in auctions
• On efficiency of the English auction
• On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• Using and abusing economic theory

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