English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
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Publication:1748368
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Cites work
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3162431 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3539473 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Risk Aversion and the Choice Between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings
Cited in
(11)- Risky procurement with an insider bidder
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk
- Limited liability and high bids in English auctions
- English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Buy-price English auction
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences
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