Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0317-4MaRDI QIDQ1411102zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oleksii Birulin

Publication date 16 October 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionEfficiencyEx-post equilibriumVCG mechnism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(7)

• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• Ex post implementation
• English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
• Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6314686 (Why is no real title available?)
• Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

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