Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.06.002zbMATH Open1274.91221OpenAlexW2090473587MaRDI QIDQ380862FDOQ380862

Authors: Wedad J. Elmaghraby, Nathan C. Larson 

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000863?np=y

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zbMATH Keywords

learningauctionsprocurementsynergiesasymmetric biddersexperimentaloptimization errors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• `Stochastically more risk averse': a contextual theory of stochastic discrete choice under risk
• Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
• Two measures of difficulty
• Can core allocations be achieved in avoidable fixed cost environments using two-part price competition?
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Probabilistic risk aversion with an arbitrary outcome set
• Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

Cited In (1)

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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