Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.06.002MaRDI QIDQ380862zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wedad J. Elmaghraby, Nathan C. Larson

Publication date 14 November 2013

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000863?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

learningauctionsprocurementsynergiesasymmetric biddersexperimentaloptimization errors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions
• Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• Bounds in auctions with unobserved heterogeneity
• Optimal auctions: non-expected utility and constant risk aversion
• Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions

Cites work

• Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Can core allocations be achieved in avoidable fixed cost environments using two-part price competition?
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
• Probabilistic risk aversion with an arbitrary outcome set
• Two measures of difficulty
• `Stochastically more risk averse': a contextual theory of stochastic discrete choice under risk

Cited in

(1)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795167 (Why is no real title available?)

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q380862)