Can core allocations be achieved in avoidable fixed cost environments using two-part price competition?

DOI10.1007/BF02205449MaRDI QIDQ2365104zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yvonne Durham, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, Nathaniel T. Wilcox, Mark V. van Boening

Publication date 4 February 1997

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02205449

zbMATH Keywords

coredouble auction institutionexperimental economicsprice-quantity bidssmart marketstwo-part prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(1)

• Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

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