Can core allocations be achieved in avoidable fixed cost environments using two-part price competition?

DOI10.1007/BF02205449zbMath0867.90042MaRDI QIDQ2365104

Stephen J. Rassenti, Nathaniel T. Wilcox, Yvonne Durham, Vernon L. Smith, Mark V. van Boening

Publication date: 4 February 1997

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coreexperimental economicsdouble auction institutionprice-quantity bidssmart marketstwo-part prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

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