On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

DOI10.3982/TE1198MaRDI QIDQ4586066zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1198

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian implementabilitycompetitive equilibriumcomplementscore outcomessubstitutesVickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(24)

• A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• Can core allocations be achieved in avoidable fixed cost environments using two-part price competition?
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions
• Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion
• Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market
• Optimal auctions through deep learning: advances in differentiable economics
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Reallocative auctions and core selection
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions

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