Package Auctions and Exchanges

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2007.00778.XMaRDI QIDQ5441267zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date 11 February 2008

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00778.x

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial biddingcorepackage auctionstable match

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(22)

• A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms
• Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
• Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges
• The package assignment model.
• A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
• Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• Assembly problems
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
• Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
• First price package auction with many traders
• On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems
• Scheduling with package auctions
• The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
• Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
• Solving strong-substitutes product-mix auctions
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
• Optimal job assignment with spillover effects
• Reallocative auctions and core selection
• The economics of equilibrium with indivisible goods

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