Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.06.003MaRDI QIDQ1782326zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Bichler, Stefan Waldherr

Publication date 20 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionscombinatorial exchangescorepricing equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• The package assignment model.
• Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
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Cites work

• Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• On the Existence of General Equilibrium for a Competitive Market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The package assignment model.

Cited in

(4)

• Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
• The package assignment model.
• Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
• Package Auctions and Exchanges

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